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Bayesian cognitive science, predictive brains, and the nativism debate 
Abstract The rise of Bayesianism in cognitive science promises to shape the debate between 
nativists and empiricists into more productive forms—or so have claimed several philosophers and 
cognitive scientists. The present paper explicates this claim, distinguishing different ways of 
understanding it. After clarifying what is at stake in the controversy between nativists and 
empiricists, and what is involved in current Bayesian cognitive science, the paper argues that 
Bayesianism offers not a vindication of either nativism or empiricism, but one way to talk precisely 
and transparently about the kinds of mechanisms and representations underlying the acquisition of 
psychological traits without a commitment to an innate language of thought. 
 
1 Introduction 
Several philosophers and cognitive scientists believe that Bayesianism in cognitive science has 
novel, important consequences for the controversy between nativists and empiricists. For instance, 
Tenenbaum and colleagues (2011) claim that “the Bayesian approach lets us move beyond classic 
either-or dichotomies that have long shaped and limited debates in cognitive science.” One such 
dichotomies is either empiricism or nativism (p. 1285). Clark (2013a, 2013b; 2016) agrees that 
Bayesianism “should fundamentally reconfigure our thinking about the debate between nativism 
and empiricism” (2013a, p. 482). Also Samet & Zaitchik (2014) seem to agree, and they single out 
Bayesianism as an especially relevant approach to the contemporary controversy surrounding 
innateness in cognitive science. 
 While there is agreement that Bayesianism bears on the debate between nativists and 
empiricists, it remains unclear just how. Existing literature in Bayesian cognitive science does not 
elucidate what’s exactly at stake in that debate, and philosophers who have suggested that the brain 
might approximately implement Bayesian inference (Hohwy 2013; Clark 2016) have not rigorously 
explained relevant similarities and differences between distinct approximations for Bayesian 
inference. 
 Two distinct types of ideas are conflated in the literature. The first idea is that Bayesianism 
matters to the debate because it bears out aspects of both nativist and empiricist views.
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Specifically, Bayesianism would vindicate empiricists’ emphasis on learning from experience as the 
central process in the acquisition of new psychological traits; but Bayesianism would also vindicate 
nativists’ emphasis on the role of prior knowledge in acquiring new psychological traits. 
 Tenenbaum and colleagues (2011), Clark (2013a, 2013b; 2016), and Samet & Zaitchik 
(2014) can be read as having this idea in mind when they claim that Bayesianism matters to the 
controversy between nativists and empiricists. On the one hand, they all point out that Bayesianism 
offers previously unappreciated resources to empiricists, who can rely on hierarchical Bayesian 
modelling to show that the information required for the acquisition of high-level psychological 
traits need not be hardwired in a system, but can be picked up in the environmental input. On the 
other hand, as explained by Samet & Zaitchik (2014), Bayesianism vindicates aspects of nativism 
too, “because it focuses attention on the role of background knowledge in learning.” In these 
                                                          
1
 Not all Bayesian models are meant to make substantial claims about the mechanisms and representations 
underlying cognition and behaviour. Some Bayesian models are meant to offer only an encompassing 
mathematical template that can be applied to a wide range of phenomena in order to provide computational-
level analyses (Anderson 1990; Marr 1982) and/or in order to unify these phenomena without making 
commitments to underlying mechanisms and representations (Colombo & Hartmann 2015; Danks 2014, Ch. 
8). Following Clark (2013a; 2013b) and Samet & Zaitchik (2014, note 28), here I set aside questions about 
the psychological reality of Bayesian models (Colombo & Seriès 2012). Rather, I assume that Bayesianism 
offers not only a mathematical template or computational-level analyses. Bayesianism can also make 
substantial empirical claims about the nature of learning mechanisms and representations (cf., Hohwy 2013; 
Clark 2013b, 2016). 
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respects, however, Bayesianism recapitulates previous approaches like Connectionism; and so, it 
does not provide us with a fundamentally novel way to think about the debate between nativists and 
empiricists. 
 A distinct idea is that Bayesianism matters because it makes the debate more empirically 
tractable than previous approaches. Bayesianism would provide us with a distinctively precise and 
semantically transparent way to talk about and test how psychological traits might be acquired. 
Samet & Zaitchik (2014) recognize this point when they highlight that Bayesianism “provides a 
systematic and quantifiable approach to development.” Perfors, Tenenbaum and colleagues (2011, 
p. 317) also emphasise this virtue of Bayesianism: “its representational flexibility makes it 
applicable to a wide variety of learning problems, and its transparency makes it easy to be clear 
about what assumptions are being made, what is being learned, and why learning works.” However, 
while Bayesianism is more semantically transparent than an approach like Connectionism, it 
recapitulates Classicism in this respect; and so, it does not provide us with a fundamentally novel 
way to think about the debate between nativists and empiricists. 
 Presenting aspects of both Classicism and Connectionism, what Bayesianism brings to the 
table—I suggest—is a transparent way of evaluating the character of the innate structure in the 
human cognitive architecture without the need for a commitment to an innate language of thought. 
In arguing for this claim, my goal is not to defend a particular nativist or empiricist position. My 
goal is instead to clarify how Bayesianism can frame the debate in a more productive form. 
 In order to achieve my goal, I start, in Section 2, to clarify how the dialectical situation 
between nativists and empiricists should be understood. In Sections 3 and 4, I examine the nature 
and role of Bayesian priors in visual perception, and show that the fact that Bayesianism posits 
priors does not have implications for the controversy. In Sections 5 and 6, I focus on Bayesian 
learning mechanisms in categorization tasks, and show that the fact that Bayesianism posits a 
general-purpose learning mechanism like Bayesian conditionalization does not have implications 
for the controversy. In Section 7, I compare Bayesianism with Connectionism and Classicism, 
which are two prominent alternative approaches to cognitive change, and argue that Bayesianism 
recapitulates aspects of both Connectionism and Classicism. A short conclusion follows. 
 
2 Nativism vs. Empiricism. What’s at stake? 
‘Nativism’ and ‘Empiricism’ pick out broad families of views concerning the origin of 
psychological traits and the shape of the underlying cognitive architecture, where ‘psychological 
traits’ may refer to abilities, capacities, ideas, or concepts. Contemporary nativists and empiricists 
agree that both nature and nurture matter to questions about the origin of psychological traits. They 
agree that there are genetic and environmental contributions to the acquisition of psychological 
traits. Both sides also agree that the acquisition of psychological traits depends on a certain amount 
of innate structure. The disagreement concerns the character of this innate structure. It concerns the 
question: What kinds of mechanisms and representations in humans’ innate cognitive architecture 
are causally responsible for the acquisition of psychological traits? (cf., Cowie 1999, p. 26; 
Margolis & Laurence 2013, p. 695). 
 Empiricists posit as little innate endowment as possible. According to them, the innate 
architecture of the mind includes few general-purpose (or domain-general) mechanisms for 
acquiring psychological traits. Because these mechanisms are general-purpose, they operate in a 
wide range of different psychological domains. For example, general-purpose learning mechanisms 
like statistical learning and pattern recognition would operate in a wide variety of different 
psychological domains, and would suffice to acquiring such psychological traits as a language, 
knowledge of causal relations in the world, the ability to ascribe mental states to other agents, and 
so on (cf., Prinz 2012; on language learning and empiricism see Elman 1991, and Chater, Clark, 
Goldsmith, & Perfors 2015). As these learning mechanisms are responsible for the acquisition of 
psychological traits by extracting statistical regularities in the environment, “whatever 
differentiation into domain-specific cognitive systems there might be will reflect differentiation in 
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the [statistical structure in the] environment and not our innate endowments” (Samuels 1998, p. 
576). 
 Nativists posit a richer innate endowment. According to them, the innate architecture of the 
mind includes many domain-specific mechanisms and/or bodies of knowledge for acquiring new 
psychological traits (Simpson et al. 2005; for a comprehensive discussion of different nativisms see 
Carruthers, Laurence, & Stich 2005, 2006, 2007). Domain-specific mechanisms operate in a 
restricted class of problems in a narrow range of psychological domains. For example, according to 
some evolutionary approaches to psychology, psychological traits such as the abilities to recognize 
faces, ascribe mental states to others, and identify cheaters in social exchanges could be acquired 
only through Darwinian modules, each one of which is dedicated to operate in one psychological 
domain (Carruthers 2006; Pinker 2002; Sperber 1994). A domain-specific body of knowledge is a 
system of mental representations about a specific subject matter such as physics and psychology, 
which apply to a distinct domain of entities and phenomena (Carey & Spelke 1994). For example, 
according to some generativist approaches to linguistics, language can be acquired only because our 
cognitive architecture contains an innate Universal Grammar, which consists of a body of domain-
specific knowledge about the grammatical principles of human natural languages and applies to 
sentences and their constituents (Chomsky 1980, 1988). 
 In summary, the disagreement between contemporary nativists and empiricists is about the 
kinds of learning mechanisms and representations in humans’ innate cognitive architecture. 
Empiricists are committed to a kind of cognitive architecture that includes few general-purpose 
mechanisms that are ultimately responsible for the acquisition of all psychological traits. Nativists 
are committed to a kind of cognitive architecture that is rich in domain-specific mechanisms and/or 
representations that are ultimately responsible for the acquisition of all psychological traits. 
 Three points of elaboration are in order. First, nativism and empiricism admit of degrees. 
One may be nativist (or empiricist) about a greater or smaller portion of the psychological traits in 
the human cognitive architecture. Second, while domain-specific bodies of knowledge may be 
processed by domain-specific mechanisms, this need not be so. As Samuels (1998, p. 583) explains, 
humans may possess a single general-purpose mechanism like a single universal Turing machine 
that deploys internally represented, domain-specific bodies of knowledge. Thus, one may posit 
innate bodies of knowledge about the principles of language, while allowing that the mechanism 
that recruits such representations be general-purpose (cf., Fodor 2001, pp. 106-9). Third and finally, 
the controversy between nativists and empiricists presupposes the legitimacy of some notion of 
innateness in cognitive science. Although innateness is multiply ambiguous (Mameli & Bateson 
2006), may not correspond to any natural kind (Mameli & Bateson 2011), and may obscure the 
complexities of ontogenesis (Scholz 2002), this notion often features in discussions of the relation 
between Bayesian cognitive science and the nativism debate without a clear explication (cf., Samet 
& Zaitchik 2014, Sec 3.2). As I shall point out below in Section 4, sometimes these discussions 
seem to assume an explication of innateness in terms of psychological primitiveness, where 
psychologically primitive traits are the ones whose acquisition cannot be explained by any adequate 
theory in cognitive science (Cowie 1999; Samuels 2002). Sometimes they assume an explication in 
terms of developmental canalization, which roughly corresponds to the degree of developmental 
rigidity of a trait in the face of variation across a range of environments (Ariew 1999; see also 
Mallon & Weinberg 2006). Some other time, they assume an explication of innateness in terms of 
adaptation, according to which a psychological trait is innate if its acquisition can only be explained by 
natural selection (cf., Lorenz 1965). Evaluating how Bayesianism matters for the debate between 
nativists and empiricists requires clarity about the explication of innateness one presupposes. 
 
3 Bayesian priors between nativism and empiricism 
A characterisation of Bayesianism in cognitive science goes as follows. Take some problem that 
cognitive agents face—for example, disambiguating convex from concave shapes from shading 
information, or grouping objects into categories. Formulate the problem in probabilistic terms by 
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defining a model of the process that generates some data, d—for example, two-dimensional retinal 
images, or exemplars of some underlying category. Let H be a set of (exhaustive and mutually 
exclusive) hypotheses about the process (known as hypothesis space). For each hypothesis h  H, 
P(h) is the probability that the agent assigns to h being the true generating process, prior to 
observing the data d. P(h) is known as the prior probability. The Bayesian rule of conditionalization 
prescribes that, after observing data d, the agent should update P(h) by replacing it with P(h | d) 
(known as the posterior probability). To execute the rule of conditionalization, the agent multiplies 
the prior P(h) by the likelihood P(d | h) as stated by Bayes’ theorem:2 
 [1]   𝑃(ℎ|𝑑) =  
𝑃(𝑑|ℎ)𝑃(ℎ)
∑ 𝑃(𝑑|ℎ)𝑃(ℎ)ℎ∈𝐻
 
where P(d | h) is the probability of observing d if h were true (known as likelihood), and the sum in 
the denominator ensures that the resulting probabilities sum to one. According to [1], the posterior 
probability of h is directly proportional to the product of its prior probability and likelihood, relative 
to the sum of the products and likelihoods for all alternative hypotheses in the hypothesis space H. 
The rule of conditionalization prescribes that the agent should adopt the posterior P(h | d) as a 
revised probability assignment for h: the new probability of h should be proportional to its prior 
probability multiplied by its likelihood. 
 Bayesian conditionalization alone does not specify how an agent’s beliefs should be used to 
generate a decision or an action. How to use the posterior distribution to generate a decision is 
described by Bayesian decision theory, and requires the definition of a loss (or utility) function L(A, 
H). For each action a  A—where A is the space of possible actions or decisions available to the 
agent—the loss function specifies the relative cost of taking action a for each possible h  H. To 
choose the best action, the agent calculates the expected loss for each a, which is the loss averaged 
across the possible h, weighted by the degree of belief in h. The action with the minimum expected 
loss is the best action that the agent can take given her beliefs. 
 Given this characterisation of the Bayesian approach,
3
 one common suggestion is that “the 
key issue in considering the bearing of Bayesianism on the Nativist-Empiricist controversy is the 
priors” (Samet & Zaitchik 2014). The basic idea is that “[i]nnate assumptions and principles […] 
are realized as priors” with certain default values that get updated  via interaction with the 
environment (Scholl 2005, pp. 48-9). 
 However, because empiricists and nativists do agree that the human cognitive architecture is 
comprised of some innate structure, and they can also agree that this innate structure might be 
realized as Bayesian priors, this basic idea leaves many key issues in the debate surrounding 
nativism open, such as: Are all Bayesian priors evolved psychological traits, or are they 
psychological traits culturally acquired in cognitive development? Are all Bayesian priors 
psychologically primitive? Are they robust to environmental variation? Are all (or most) Bayesian 
priors domain-specific representations? While different answers to these more specific questions 
underwrite different positions in the nativism-empiricism spectrum, Bayesianism is not committed 
to positing a cognitive architecture that is rich in domain-specific representations realized as priors, 
which are ultimately responsible for the acquisition of all other psychological traits. To establish 
this claim, I now concentrate on the light-from-above prior, which is often cited as a 
characteristically nativist psychological trait. 
 
                                                          
2
 Bayes’ theorem is a provable mathematical statement that expresses the relationship between conditional 
probabilities and their inverses. Bayes’ theorem expressed in odds form is known as Bayes’ rule. The rule of 
conditionalization is a prescriptive norm that dictates how to reallocate probabilities in light of new evidence 
or data. 
3
 It is worth pointing out that Bayesianism is by no means the only theory of learning and decision-making 
under uncertainty (see Colombo, Elkin, Hartmann 2016 for a critical treatment of Bayesianism in cognitive 
science and its possible alternatives). 
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4 Light-from above through Bayesian lenses 
The light-from-above prior is the prior “belief” that light shines from overhead (precisely, from 
above-left). It is often cited as an example of a characteristically nativist trait because it would be a 
paradigmatic example of an internally represented body of innate knowledge specific to lighting 
source (Hershberger 1970; Ramachandran 1988; Kersten, Mamassian & Yuille 2004, p. 285; 
Mamassian & Goutcher 2001; Scholl 2005; Samet & Zaitchik 2014; for a general account of priors 
in visual perception see Sotiropoulos & Seriès 2015). 
 In describing the light-from-above prior as a paradigmatic example of an innate, domain-
specific representation, the literature confuses two questions.
4
 First question: Is the light-from-
above prior malleable, or is it rigid? Second question: Is the light-from-above prior a 
psychologically primitive domain-specific representation, or can this trait be acquired courtesy of 
some general-purpose mechanism that does not tap internally represented domain-specific 
knowledge? 
 The first question assumes an explication of innateness in terms of developmental 
canalization that roughly corresponds to the degree of developmental rigidity of a trait in the face of 
variation across a range of environments (Ariew 1999; see also Mallon & Weinberg 2006). The 
second question assumes an explication of innateness in terms of psychological primitiveness 
(Cowie 1999; Samuels 2002), and asks whether the light-from-above prior is a domain-specific 
representation, whose acquisition cognitive science cannot explain. 
 Let’s consider the first question. Is the light-from-above prior developmentally rigid? 
Hershberger (1970) offered preliminary evidence that it is rigid. He showed that chickens reared in 
cages illuminated from below still behaved as though light was coming from above. From this 
result, Hershberger concluded that the light-from-above prior is developmentally rigid, and 
therefore is probably innate. 
 However, more recent psychophysical studies with human adults and children do not bear 
out this conclusion. These studies show that human observers’ light-from-above prior is not rigid to 
subtle variation in environmental and developmental circumstances. If ‘innate’ is understood as a 
kind of developmental robustness or rigidity, then these studies show that the light-from-above 
prior is not an innate psychological trait. 
 Adams, Graf, & Ernst (2004) found that the light-from-above prior can be modified by 
repeated haptic feedback about the shape of an object. In their experiment, human adults made 
convex-concave judgements of bump-dent stimuli illuminated by a single light source. In making 
these judgements, they initially assumed the light source be roughly overhead, which enabled them 
to extract information about the shape of the stimuli from their shading. During a training phase, the 
same experimental participants made convex-concave judgements, while they were exposed to 
stimuli that appeared to be lit from the side. After each judgement, they received haptic feedback 
regarding shape, which reinforced the visual appearance that lighting came from the side. In a post 
training phase, when participants judged a set of visual stimuli identical to those in the initial 
condition, their “light prior” had shifted significantly from overhead towards the side, causing 
altered shape judgements. Furthermore, this acquired light-from-the-side prior was found to transfer 
                                                          
4
 Some treatments in Bayesian cognitive science (e.g., Seydell, Knill, & Trommershauser 2011) assume an 
explication of innateness in terms of adaptation, according to which innate traits are those whose acquisition 
can only be explained by natural selection. Assuming this explication, these treatments associate the question 
of whether Bayesian priors are innate with the question of whether Bayesian priors match the statistics of 
natural environments. The idea is that if a prior like the light-from-above prior matches the relative 
frequency of light sources coming from overhead, then the prior can be explained by natural selection, and so 
is probably innate. However, the fact that the light-from-above prior, and other well-studied Bayesian priors 
like the slow-speed prior (Stocker & Simoncelli 2006), might reflect natural frequencies in the environment 
(Simoncelli & Olshausen 2001) does not warrant the inference that they are explained by natural selection, 
nor does it warrant the inference that Bayesian priors should be tuned to natural frequencies (Feldman 2013; 
for a compact discussion of this point see Sotiropoulos & Seriès 2015, Sec 3.4). 
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to a different task, where observers judged which one of two sides of an oriented object was lighter 
in the absence of any evidence about the light-source. 
 In another experiment with human adults, Morgenstern et al. (2011) found that the light-
from-above prior is also easily overridden by other sensory cues. In this study, experimental 
participants estimated the shape of an object from shading information. Morgenstern and colleagues 
inferred the ratio between the weight participants gave to their light-from-above prior and the 
weight they gave to lighting cues of different strength. It turned out that the prior accounted for very 
weak lighting information, as its impact could be quashed by barely perceptible lighting cues like 
low-contrast shadows. 
 Other studies in developmental psychology support the idea that Bayesian priors need not 
correspond to psychological traits that develop rigidly despite variability in environmental statistics. 
For example, Thomas et al. (2010) had 4- to 12-year-old children make convex/concave judgements 
for a shaded “polo mint” stimulus. They found an interaction between a light-from-above prior and 
a convexity prior that changed over the course of development: a convexity prior would have more 
weight early in childhood, while a light-from-above prior would have more weight only later on 
during puberty. Coherent with this conclusion is Stone’s (2011) result that the light-from-above 
prior is malleable throughout childhood. These results would be explained by the fact that “light 
does not come from a consistent direction relative to one’s own body (which is the frame of 
reference used in judging shape from shading until around 7 years of age) until children are able to 
walk” (Thomas et al. 2010, p. 6). So, the light-from-above prior is neither rigid nor is it invariant to 
variation in the statistical structure of the developmental environment. If we assume an analysis of 
innateness as a kind of developmental canalization, it is therefore unjustified to believe that the 
light-from-above prior must be an innate trait. 
 Let’s now consider the second question. Is the light-from-above prior a psychologically 
primitive domain-specific representation? There are three sets of considerations supporting a 
negative answer. First, domain-specific representations apply to a restricted class of entities and 
phenomena (Carey & Spelke 1994). However, Adams (2007) showed that the light-from-above 
prior applies to a relatively wide range of different entities and phenomena, as it would be engaged 
in visual search, shape perception, and reflectance judgement. This finding coheres with the idea 
that the light-from-above prior is not a psychologically primitive domain-specific representation, 
but is acquired through some general-purpose learning mechanism that is sensitive to the general 
predominance of overhead lighting. 
 Second, most Bayesian work in the psychophysics of perception assumes that priors such as 
the light-from-above prior have a particular univariate parametric form (e.g., a Gaussian distribution 
of one random variable associated with a specific environmental property), which might be taken to 
suggest that Bayesian priors must be bodies of domain-specific knowledge. However, in estimating 
shape from shading, at least two parameters are involved: one over lighting direction, another over 
shapes. Generally, these two parameters are assumed to be independent, which can make the 
learning tractable, ensuring that the estimated univariate prior distribution over lighting direction is 
the same as a joint distribution over lighting direction and shape.
5
 Independence properties ensure 
that the priors employed in much Bayesian cognitive science, particularly in psychophysics, are 
specific to a single parameter (or environmental property). But the independence assumption 
between parameters is generally unjustified, because several parameters are correlated with one 
another in the environment. Hence, many of the priors employed in Bayesian cognitive science 
should be understood as high-dimensional priors that may not be specific to any individual 
parameter. A high-dimensional prior spans many different environmental parameters at the same 
time; and so, the class of situations is large, in which this very same prior can be recruited for 
acquiring novel psychological traits. 
                                                          
5
 More precisely, the assumption of parameter independence implies that the marginal distribution is the 
same as the conditional distribution. 
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 Third and finally, Bayesian priors like the light-from-above prior may themselves be 
acquired courtesy of some general-purpose mechanism that does not tap internally represented 
domain-specific knowledge. This means that Bayesian priors need not be psychologically primitive 
bodies of domain-specific knowledge. Clark (2013a, 2016 Sec 6.3) makes this point by drawing on 
work by Kemp et al. (2007) and Tenenbaum et al. (2011). He writes: “multilayer Bayesian systems 
have proven capable of acquiring abstract, domain-specific principles without building in the kinds 
of knowledge […] that subsequently account for the ease and efficacy of learning in different 
domains” (2013a, p. 488). 
 In hierarchical Bayesian systems, the hypothesis space has a hierarchical structure, and the 
only psychologically primitive, built-in knowledge is at the highest level of the hierarchy. This 
built-in knowledge is generic, as it corresponds to a hyper-prior on a hyper-parameter, which is a 
parameter of a prior distribution at the level below. While hyper-priors impose constraints on the 
kinds and range of representations the system can acquire, these constraints are increasingly weak 
as the number of levels in the system increases. “By adding further levels of abstraction to an HBM 
[hierarchical Bayesian model] while keeping pre-specified parameters to a minimum, at the highest 
levels of the model, we can come increasingly close to the classical empiricist proposal for the 
bottom-up, data-driven origins of abstract knowledge” (Perfors et al 2011, p. 308; Perfors 2012). 
This means that hierarchical Bayesian systems that initially encode hyper-priors “concerning very 
abstract (at times almost Kantian) features of the world” (Clark 2013a, p. 487) can acquire domain-
specific bodies of knowledge like the light-from-above prior by extracting structure from the 
environmental input (see Lee & Mumford 2003 for relevant neurophysiological evidence; for early 
neural networks that extract shape from shading see Lehky & Sejnowski 1988, 1990). 
 In summary, the initially given hyper-priors in a hierarchically organized Bayesian system 
are typically not domain-specific. If these hyper-priors are not domain-specific, and can explain 
how domain-specific representations like the light-from-above prior are acquired, then these 
representations are not psychologically primitive. If we assume an analysis of innateness as a kind 
of psychological primitiveness, it is therefore unjustified to believe that the light-from-above prior 
must be an innate trait. 
 Before moving on, there is something important to flag. Clark (2013a, 2013b, 2016) and 
Tenenbaum et al (2011) have Hierarchical Bayesian modelling in mind, when they claim that 
Bayesianism has fundamental consequences for the nativism vs. empiricism debate. In Clark’s 
(2013a) words: 
 
“Hierarchical Bayesian modelling shows that acquisition of psychological trait can proceed just as if it had 
been constrained by apt bodies of innate knowledge […] it demonstrates that the potent, accelerated, domain-
specific learning profiles often associated with such knowledge may also be displayed by systems that begin 
from much more minimal bases […] The HBM accounts on offer share the singular virtue of accommodating 
many empiricist intuitions (for example, those concerning flexibility in the face of new environmental 
inputs) while leaving room for as much innate knowledge as well-controlled experimental studies may (or 
may not) eventually mandate” (p. 495). 
 
 The basic ideas are twofold: that Hierarchical Bayesian models equip the empiricist with 
previously unappreciated resources, and that Hierarchical Bayesian models have the singular virtue 
to provide both nativists and empiricists with a way of precisely assessing the relative contributions 
of both “innate, domain-specific knowledge” and “domain-general learning mechanisms” (Griffiths, 
Kemp, & Tenenbaum 2008, p. 62). 
 I shall return to these ideas in Section 7. For now, suffices it to anticipate that the same 
enthusiasm was shown over 25 years ago, during the resurgence of Connectionism. Because 
connectionist models showed that data-driven induction and minimal initial biases could suffice to 
acquire novel, domain-specific bodies of knowledge (Clark 1993a; Elman et al. 1998), 
Connectionism was said to fundamentally reconfigure the debate between nativists and empiricists, 
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which was shaped by Fodor’s (1975, 1981) and Chomsky’s (1980) Classical computationalism back 
then. 
 
5 Bayesian mechanisms between Nativism and Empiricism 
Another common belief is that Bayesianism in cognitive science is committed to positing general-
purpose learning mechanisms. In an influential review of Bayesian approaches in developmental 
psychology, Xu (2007, p. 214) asks: “Is the Bayesian inference mechanism domain-general, and if 
yes, in what sense?” She answers: “I have suggested… that this is not a mechanism specific to word 
learning, or language, or causal reasoning. However—she continues—I am not claiming that the 
same token of the Bayesian inference mechanism is used again and again in various domains. 
Rather Bayesian inference is a type of learning mechanism that can be instantiated many times over 
in the human brain/mind” (cf., Perfors et al. 2011, p. 316; Xu & Griffiths 2011). 
 When Xu (2007) describes Bayesian inference as “a type of learning mechanism,” she has in 
mind the Bayesian rule of conditionalization for computing posterior distributions. But this is not 
the mechanism that is actually involved in the accounts of word learning and causal reasoning she 
reviews. The types of mechanisms that are used to account for word learning and causal reasoning, 
and that might be tokened in the human “brain/mind,” cannot amount to simple conditionalization, 
because simple Bayesian conditionalization makes these learning tasks intractable. For tasks that 
involve high dimensionality, or complicated and unusual statistical structures, different types of 
mechanisms are required for updating “beliefs” and acquiring new psychological traits. So, 
Bayesian conditionalization and more specific types of Bayesian mechanisms should be kept 
distinct when we ask questions about the nature of Bayesian learning mechanisms. 
 Almost all accounts of the acquisition of high-level psychological traits, and of several low-
level perceptual traits too, do not involve simple Bayesian conditionalization. They involve 
approximations like Monte Carlo and variational learning mechanisms, which can be tokened in a 
number of different ways depending on the problem in hand. We should examine the nature of these 
mechanisms, if we want to understand the possible implications of Bayesianism for the controversy 
between nativism and empiricism. 
 Some of the approximately Bayesian learning mechanisms that can tractably underlie the 
acquisition of psychological traits like the abilities to learn words or to acquire causal knowledge 
are more domain-specific than others. These mechanisms all employ precise probabilities to 
represent uncertainty, update probabilities in accord with the axioms of probability, and provide an 
approximation of the target posterior distribution. This is the only sense in which they are all 
Bayesian. There is no simply a Bayesian mechanism; but different species Bayesian mechanisms 
with a number of specific properties. 
 Bayesian decision theory offers a unifying mathematical language (Colombo & Hartmann 
2015) along with a package of different methods for learning and inference. Depending on the 
details of the problem associated with the acquisition of a certain psychological trait—e.g., the size 
of the hypothesis space, the shape of the joint distribution over data and parameters, the time 
available to find a solution, and computational constraints on memory and search—Bayesianism 
can posit, equally plausibly, acquisition mechanisms that are domain-specific, or that are general-
purpose. So, Bayesianism is not committed to positing a cognitive architecture that includes few 
general-purpose learning mechanisms that are ultimately responsible for the acquisition of 
psychological traits. I now sharpen and establish this conclusion by examining two types of Monte 
Carlo algorithms as mechanisms for category learning.
6
 
 
6 Bayesian mechanisms for acquiring categories 
                                                          
6
 This point could only be strengthened if alternative types of mechanisms are also examined that involve, for 
example, the Laplace approximation or variational algorithms. 
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From a probabilistic perspective, the computational problem of category learning is to identify a 
probability distribution associated with each one of the available category labels. Category learning 
would consist of a problem of probability density
7
 estimation (Ashby & Alfonso-Reese 1995). 
Given the features (denoted by d) of an item, one should infer the category label c for that item from 
the set of available category labels C. For instance, given the features “has feathers,” “has wings,” 
“has a beak” for an item, one should infer the category label “Bird” from the set of available 
categories. Using Bayesian conditionalization, the posterior over category labels is: 
 
 [2]  𝑃(𝑐|𝑑) =  
𝑃(𝑑|𝑐)𝑃(𝑐)
∑ 𝑃(𝑑|𝑐′)𝑃(𝑐′)𝑐′∈𝐶
=  
𝑃(𝑑,𝑐)
∑ 𝑃(𝑑,𝑐′)𝑐′∈𝐶
 
 For categorization problems where the likelihoods can have any interesting structure, or 
where the space C of category labels is too large and complex, the posterior P (c | d) cannot be 
computed tractably. For these problems, only approximations for the target posterior can be 
tractably computed. One class of mechanisms for computing such approximations consist of 
algorithms based on the Monte Carlo principle, which says that anything we want to know about a 
random variable  can be learned by sampling many times from the distribution P( ). This 
principle grounds a family of algorithms, which become increasingly accurate in approximating a 
target posterior distribution as the number of samples they use increase. 
 Two Monte Carlo algorithms that have been used to solve category learning problems are 
Gibbs sampling and particle filtering. The basic idea behind the Gibbs sampling algorithm is that 
joint probability densities can be characterised as component conditional densities. For all variables 
of a target joint distribution, the Gibbs sampler algorithm begins by selecting one variable—the 
order in which the Gibbs sampler selects variables does not affect its computations—then samples 
one value of that variable, and finally conditions the sampled value on the values of all other 
random variables and all data. Once all random variables are sampled, the Gibbs sampler has 
finished one iteration, which yields a distribution that approximates the target posterior. The 
accuracy of this approximation improves as a function of the number of iterations of the algorithm. 
 The basic idea behind the particle filter algorithm is that any joint probability density can be 
characterised as sets of samples (or particles) drawn from probability densities ‘related’ to the target 
joint probability density. For a target posterior distribution P (ct | d1, …, dt), the particle filter 
algorithm begins by generating a known ‘proposal distribution,’ which is related to the target one. 
For instance, the proposal distribution may be the prior probability P (ct | d1, …, dt-1). The algorithm 
first draws samples from the proposal distribution, then assigns each resulting sample a weight 
proportional to the probability that the sample comes from the target distribution. The same 
operation is repeated for all time steps t. Thus, the particle filter algorithm can get to approximate P 
(ct | d1, …, dt) by sampling and re-sampling from a sequence of related distributions P (ct-1 | d1, …, 
dt-1), appropriately weighing each sample. 
 Both the Gibbs sampler and the particle filter algorithms are flexible, since they can be 
applied across different problem domains and can approximate complex, non-linear, non-Gaussian 
joint distributions. However, they differ in important ways. For example, the Gibbs sampler 
assumes that all data are available at the time of learning and inference: if new data arrive over the 
course of processing of the Gibbs sampler, then the Gibbs sampler must start its processing anew, 
which makes it unsuitable for online, sequential learning. Instead, the particle filter algorithm 
assumes that data are collected progressively over time: posterior distributions are approximated by 
propagating samples, whose weights are updated as a function of incoming observations, which 
makes particle filtering adapted to sequential environments. So, the proper domain of application of 
the Gibbs sampler corresponds to tasks where all data bearing on a certain hypothesis arrive 
                                                          
7
 For ease of presentation, I use the terms ‘probability density’ and ‘probability distribution’ interchangeably, 
although the two concepts are distinct. Roughly, a probability density function is a function that describes the 
relative likelihood for a continuous random variable to take on a given value. 
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simultaneously, while the particle filter algorithm is tailored to learning in dynamic tasks, where 
data arrive sequentially. 
 The Gibbs sampler, the particle filter, and other Bayesian algorithms were examined by 
Sanborn et al. (2010) as possible mechanisms for learning new categories. Firstly, Sanborn and 
colleagues characterised category learning in general, as a density estimation problem, where 
learners observe the features of a new item dN, and determine whether the label cN = j applies to that 
item on the basis of all previous items, dN-1 = (d1, d2, …, dN-1) and their labels cN-1 = (c1, c2, …, cN-1). 
 Three general types of mechanisms for category learning were then distinguished. The first 
type corresponds to parametric learning algorithms, where the joint distribution P (c, d) has some 
fixed parametric form. The second type corresponds to non-parametric learning algorithms, where 
the form of P (c, d) is allowed to change as the amount of data is increased. Importantly, parametric 
algorithms make stronger assumptions about the shape of P (c, d). Non-parametric algorithms do 
not assume any specific family of distributions for the category structure P (c, d). 
 As Ashby and Alfonso-Reese (1995) point out, parametric learning mechanisms are 
naturally associated with prototype-based category learning, while non-parametric mechanisms are 
associated with exemplar-based category learning. So, insofar as we learn categories on the basis of 
both exemplars and prototypes, our cognitive architecture may well include both parametric and 
non-parametric Bayesian learning mechanisms. 
 A third, intermediate, type of learning mechanism discussed by Sanborn and colleagues 
assumes that categories are broken down into several clusters z = (z1, z2, …, zN); each cluster z is 
assigned a parametric distribution and the category distribution becomes a mixture model associated 
with the joint distribution P (c, d, z), where each cluster is represented by a parametric distribution, 
and the full joint distribution is represented by a mixture of those distributions. 
 Sanborn and colleagues focused on a mixture model for the task of category learning: the 
Dirichlet process mixture model (DPMM), where Dirichlet distributions are used as prior 
distributions in the model, which allows capturing a broad range of densities. Sanborn et al (2010) 
compared the degree of fit of different learning mechanisms, including a Gibbs sampler and a 
particle filter, with human performance in several category learning tasks understood as DPMM. 
While they found that a particle filter algorithm had an especially good fit to humans’ learning of 
categories, their study bears out three conclusions: That different Bayesian learning mechanisms 
have different degrees of domain-specificity, where the notion of a domain should not be 
understood in terms of a subject matter; that the degree of domain-specificity of different Bayesian 
mechanisms depends on the types of assumptions they make about the statistical or temporal 
properties of a target problem, and that the Bayesian approach can posit, equally plausibly, learning 
mechanisms that are domain-specific, or else more general-purpose, for the acquisition of the same 
types of psychological traits. 
 Different Bayesian learning algorithms make different assumptions about the type of 
process that generates the data in a task of interest. Such assumptions are captured by different 
generative models, which specify a joint probability distribution over data and hypotheses—for 
instance, a joint probability P (c, d) over features of an item to categorise and sequences of category 
labels. The degree of domain-specificity of a Bayesian learning algorithm depends on the extent to 
which the algorithm is constrained to process data assumed to be produced by a generative process 
with a fixed, specific statistical form. 
 Parametric learning algorithms make stronger assumptions than non-parametric algorithms 
about the family of the probability distribution from which data are generated, though they are 
generally less memory and time consuming than non-parametric learning algorithms. Given these 
stronger assumptions, the algorithm is bound to yield a posterior with a specific form, regardless of 
the amount of data observed. So, parametric Bayesian learning algorithms are more domain-specific 
than non-parametric ones: they are constrained to process inputs of a specific sort, inputs assumed 
to be produced by a generative process associated with a fixed statistical form. 
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 Furthermore, distinct Bayesian algorithms for estimating posterior distributions, like the 
Gibbs sampling and the particle filter algorithms, are tailored to input data with different statistical 
and temporal properties. The Gibbs sampling algorithm can run to approximate a target posterior 
distribution only if all relevant data are available at a time. Thus, while a Gibbs sampler might 
underlie our ability to learning categories when all relevant exemplars are stored in memory or 
available at a time, it is fit to capture category effects on reconstruction from memory (Shi et al. 
2010). The particle filter algorithm is specifically fit to process sequential data, and to update 
probability distributions over time. Thus, a particle filter algorithm may underlie our ability to 
learning categories when exemplars are revealed sequentially; and because it is tailored to 
sequential data, a particle filter algorithm can easily capture order effects when new pieces 
information are encountered over time (Sanborn et al. 2010). 
 
7 What’s Next. Back to the future? 
There is a déjà-vu, when we read the claims made by Clark (2013 a, b; 2016), by Tenenbaum et al. 
(2011) and by other enthusiasts of the Bayesian approach in cognitive science, about how this 
approach fundamentally reconfigures the dialectic between nativists and empiricists. The same 
types of claims were made over 25 years ago, when Connectionism re-emerged as a serious 
alternative to Classical computationalism. While Connectionism and Classicism are not the only 
alternatives to Bayesianism as approaches to explaining the acquisition of psychological traits, the 
Classicism vs Connectionism debate is a useful baseline for assessing the novelty and significance 
of the contribution that Bayesian cognitive science can make to the nativism/empiricism debate. 
 Now, just like Bayesianism, Connectionism was said to have fundamental implications for 
our understanding of the debate between nativists and empiricists, which back then was shaped by 
Fodor’s (1975, 1981, 1983) and Chomsky’s (1980, 1988) Classical ideas about the architecture of 
cognition (cf., Ramsey & Stich 1991; Karmiloff-Smith 1992; Clark 1993a; Quartz 1993; Elman et 
al 1998). By the late 1970s, the Connectionist approach began to show how psychological traits can 
be acquired gradually and gracefully, courtesy of associative learning algorithms applied to a rich 
body of data, without the need to posit explicit rules and a system of atomic, domain-specific, 
representational states with combinatorial syntactic and semantic structure (aka an innate language 
of thought). Connectionism demonstrated how novel psychological traits could emerge from error-
driven changes in patterns of activation within artificial neural networks, whose architectures need 
not include a pre-wired language of thought. 
 Connectionist models demonstrated that language, face-recognition abilities, categorization, 
and many other psychological traits that were previously thought to be un-learnable, could be 
acquired courtesy of the interplay between the statistics of the environment, the knowledge 
embodied in the initial state of a neural network, and error-driven learning algorithms applicable to 
several different psychological domains (Elman et al. 1998; but see Fodor & Pylyshyn 1988 for an 
influential criticism). While the connectionist approach is not intrinsically anti-nativist, it offered 
one way to think about how the developmental trajectory of psychological traits depends “on the 
nature of the statistical structure present in everyday experience, and how this structure is exploited 
by learning” (Rogers & McClelland 2014, p. 1041). 
 Connectionism opened up a space of possible nativisms associated with different pre-setting 
of connection weights and pre-structuring of different architectures (Ramsey & Stich 1991; Clark 
1993a; Quartz 1993). In particular, Connectionism uncovered a minimal form of rationalism, which 
Clark (1993b) characterised as follows: 
 
“Instead of building in large amounts of innate knowledge and structure, build in whatever minimal set of 
biases and structure will ensure the emergence, under realistic environmental conditions, of the basic 
knowledge necessary for early success and subsequent learning.” (p. 598) 
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Minimal rationalism straddled accepted categories in the debate. It posited weak, initial biases and 
algorithmic transformation factors, which could filter incoming data with different statistical and 
temporal properties for processing in specific circuits in a network. This complex interaction 
between weak architectural biases, transformation factors, and external statistical structure could 
tug learning towards novel psychological traits, including novel, domain-specific bodies of 
knowledge. 
 Cowie (1999) makes a similar point about Connectionism, after she distinguishes 
Chomskyan Nativism from Weak Nativism and Enlightened Empiricism as logically possible 
positions about language learning. Chomskyan Nativism is committed to three ideas: (DS) that 
learning a language requires bodies of knowledge specific to the linguistic domain; (I) that the 
bodies of knowledge constraining learners’ thoughts during language learning are innate, in the 
sense that they are psychologically primitive; and (UG) that the bodies of knowledge specified in 
(DS) as being required for language learning are the principles of the Universal Grammar (Cowie 
1999, p. 176). Weak Nativism accepts (DS) and (I), but rejects (UG); Enlightened Empiricism 
accepts (DS), but rejects (I) and (UG). At various points in her treatment, Cowie suggests that at 
least some early connectionist learning algorithms underwrite Enlightened Empiricism, since they 
would display a mechanism that is both general-purpose and able to learn a language by making use 
of domain-specific knowledge acquired along the way (Cowie 1999, pp. 234ff; pp. 281ff). 
 Although Bayesianism and Connectionism differ in aspirations as well as in the kinds of 
acquisition mechanisms and representational structures they can posit (Griffiths et al. 2010; 
McClelland et al. 2010), both approaches show how data-driven inductive algorithms and weak 
initial biases can lead to the acquisition of a wide variety of psychological traits. Like 
Connectionism, Bayesianism holds that cognitive development is driven by patterns of prediction 
errors about the statistical structure of the environment, which constrains the space of possible 
trajectories of cognitive development (Téglás et al. 2011). Like Connectionism, Bayesianism can 
posit a wide variety of initial biases and algorithms that can tug learning in appropriate directions 
avoiding being held hostage of the statistics of the environmental input (Austerweil et al. 2015). 
 Most importantly, like Connectionism, Bayesianism coheres with, but does not entail, a 
form of minimal rationalism (or enlightened empiricism), exactly of the type Clark (1993a) and 
Cowie (1999) singled out as serious alternatives to Fodorian and Chomskyian nativism. For 
example, Goodman, Ullman, & Tenenbaum (2011) use the label ‘minimal nativism’ to describe 
how causal understanding can be acquired courtesy of a hierarchical Bayesian learning mechanism 
paired with innate bodies of abstract, generic knowledge, and with a collection of domain-specific 
mechanisms for analysing perceptual input. 
 Despite these analogies, Clark (2013a) identifies two problems with the Connectionist 
approach that would highlight one way of understanding how the relevance of Bayesianism for the 
nativism debate is novel and distinct. First, early connectionist models required fully supervised 
learning algorithms. Second, early connectionist models handled multilayer forms of learning with 
difficulty. 
 According to Clark (2013a), the Bayesian approach—Hierarchical Bayesian Modelling 
(HBM) in particular—avoids both problems. Unlike Connectionism, the Bayesian approach would 
show how unsupervised and self-supervised forms of hierarchical learning can be responsible for 
the quick, robust, and smooth acquisition of novel psychological traits. Stacking prior probabilities 
over prior probabilities in a hierarchically organized Bayesian model would be the key to this form 
of learning. Tenenbaum et al. (2011) explain that “each degree of freedom at a higher level of a 
HBM influences and pools evidence from many variables at levels below” (p. 1284). Hyper-priors 
in a HBM—that is, prior distributions on the parameters of a prior distribution at the lower level in 
the hierarchy—allow for potentially more complex hypotheses spaces be searched; HBM would 
also disclose a fast, robust, data-driven route to the acquisition of novel high-level psychological 
traits and abstract, domain-specific principles. 
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 However, the concern is somewhat misplaced that early connectionist models required a 
teaching signal and could handle multi-layer (or hierarchical) learning only with difficulty. On the 
one hand, it was clear already in the 1980s that both auto-encoders (aka auto-associators) and 
recurrent networks that relied on back propagation need not require labelled training data. These 
networks could successfully carry out their processing in a self-supervised fashion by learning a 
compact, invertible code that allowed them to reconstruct their own input on their output (i.e., the 
target output of an auto-encoder is the input itself) (Hinton 1989, p. 208). 
 On the other hand, multi-layer forms of learning in early connectionist models were not 
precluded, although they were indeed harder to obtain in comparison to recent advances in deep 
learning (Hinton 2014). For instance, Boltzmann machines (Hinton & Sejnowski, 1986) and 
restricted Boltzmann machines (Smolensky 1986) were early neural networks that could learn 
hierarchies of progressively more abstract and complex domain-specific representations without the 
need of any labelled data. As Clark (1993b) himself noted, pattern associators can acquire highly 
theoretical knowledge. Specifically, “multilayer nonlinear networks may develop highly abstract 
feature spaces in which continued processing is oblivious to many features of the concrete input. 
Such feature spaces may be the homes of a variety of different orders of prototype-based 
representation” (p. 103). 
 While the bearing of Bayesianism on the controversy between nativists and empiricists 
largely recapitulates that of Connectionism in these respects, Bayesianism might be thought to 
contribute a more transparent account of cognitive change in comparison to Connectionism. This 
transparency has two aspects. First, the representational and algorithmic assumptions made by 
Bayesian models are explicit: the space of the hypotheses under considerations, the prior probability 
of each hypothesis, and the relation between hypotheses and data are transparent. This transparency 
makes it relatively easy to understand what shapes a model’s behaviour, and why it fails or 
succeeds in accounting for the acquisition of a psychological trait (Griffiths et al. 2010, p. 358). 
Connectionist networks are generally more opaque, since it can be difficult to understand what 
exactly drives cognitive change, and which conditions are necessary for a certain psychological trait 
to emerge (Rogers & McClelland 2014, pp. 1056-7). 
 So, in comparison to connectionist networks, Bayesian models make it easier for cognitive 
scientists to formulate and evaluate explicit hypotheses concerning the kind of innate structure 
required for acquiring new psychological traits. For they make it more transparent and precise what 
problem a learner is supposed to solve, what kinds of primitive representational resources are 
available to the learner (Are these primitive representations domain-specific or not? What are the 
hypotheses actively represented and manipulated by the learner?), and what kinds of learning 
mechanisms the learner can use in order to acquire new psychological traits in environments with 
different statistical structures (Are the learning mechanisms general-purpose? Can they flexibly 
learn structures with different shapes? What features of the data can influence their processes?). At 
the very least, then, Bayesianism helps steer clear of pointless controversies that merely stem from 
the opacity of the causes of a model’s behaviour. 
 The transparency of Bayesianism has a second aspect too. Bayesian systems are more 
semantically transparent than Connectionist ones, where a system is “semantically transparent just 
in case it is possible to describe a neat mapping between a symbolic (conceptual level) semantic 
description of the system’s behavior and some projectible semantic interpretation of the internally 
represented objects of its formal computational activity” (Clark 1989, p. 18). According to this idea, 
the representational posits of Bayesianism, but not of Connectionism, can be related in a systematic 
way to features of the world that can be picked out propositionally, with the expressive resources of 
public language. 
 The higher degree of semantic transparency of Bayesian models should not surprise us, 
since Bayesianism is perhaps the best developed account of rational degrees of belief. Although 
hypotheses in Bayesian models can take any form, in practice they often correspond to causal 
graphs, sometimes they correspond to distributed patterns of activation in a neural network, and, 
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most interestingly here, they can also consist of structured symbols in a probabilistic language of 
thought (Ullman et al. 2012; Goodman et al. 2015). When a Bayesian system embodies structured, 
symbolic representations, it becomes transparent how to evaluate the rationality of its cognitive 
change and development. For it allows us pick out the probabilistic and logical relationships 
between its representations, and to evaluate their probabilistic and deductive coherence, both 
synchronically and diachronically. 
 Rational constructivism is in fact another label that has been used to characterise 
Bayesianism (Xu 2007; Xu & Griffiths 2011; Xu & Kushnir 2013). Rational constructivism is 
committed to three ideas: (a) that the learning mechanisms that best explain cognitive change and 
developmental are domain-general Bayesian mechanisms, which may give rise to domain-specific 
knowledge; (b) that innate (i.e. psychologically primitive) representations need not include just non-
conceptual bodies of knowledge, but may include representations of logical operators such as 
and/or/all/some, representations of variables, and logically richer representations too; and (c) that 
“the construction of new concepts and new learning biases is driven by rational inferential learning 
processes” (Xu & Griffiths 2011, p. 299). These rational inferential learning processes would 
display learning as a kind of theory construction realized as Bayesian hypothesis testing, and would 
contrast with the associative learning processes of connectionist networks, which classicists like 
Fodor conceive of as non-rational, brute-causal processes. 
 With this higher degree of semantic transparency, Bayesianism allows for a sharp distinction 
between implementation, algorithm and representation, and computational function, a distinction 
that resonates with Classical treatments of the nativism debate, but was eroded within 
Connectionism. Unlike connectionist models, where the distinction between implementation and 
function is effectively eroded, both Classicist and Bayesian models do not obviously allow for 
understanding how structural alterations in the architecture of a system may have functional 
consequences for the representational power of the system (Quartz 1993, p. 234). If this is correct, 
then Bayesianism not only recapitulates some of the implications that Connectionism had for the 
nativism vs. empiricism debate over 25 years ago, but, ironically, Bayesianism can also salvage 
some Classical ideas concerning the relations between distinct levels of cognitive analysis (Marr 
1982), and about the rational, productive, and systematic nature of thinking and learning (Fodor & 
Pylyshyn 1988). 
 
Conclusion 
Bayesianism offers a fertile source of ideas rather than a well-understood and empirically supported 
theory of the innate architecture of the human mind. To turn these ideas into substantial hypotheses 
concerning how a given psychological trait is acquired, several questions should be answered. For 
example, are we talking of an evolved trait, or of a trait culturally acquired during development, or 
of a trait acquired through a developmental process triggered by a narrow range of variation in 
environmental conditions? And what kinds of learning mechanisms and representations are 
necessary for the acquisition of the trait? While Bayesianism alone cannot answer these questions, it 
can frame them in a precise and transparent way, combining aspects of both Connectionism and 
Classicism. Like Connectionism, Bayesianism shows that an innate language of thought is not 
required to account for the acquisition of high-level psychological traits. Like Classicism, 
Bayesianism offers a transparent way of evaluating the character of the innate structure in the 
human cognitive architecture. Combining these aspects, what Bayesianism brings to the table is not 
a vindication of either nativism or empiricism, but one flexible and precise way to transparently 
evaluate the character of the innate structure in the human cognitive architecture without a 
necessary commitment to an innate language of thought. 
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